Private Equity Markets & Corporate Governance – A question of Scale

In “Private Equity, Corporate Governance and the Reinvention of the Market for Corporate Control”, Karen Wruck asserts that the reinvigorated U.S. corporate control market has had “profoundly positive effects on governance and performance of U.S. public companies.” In doing so Wruck provides us with a different perspective on the heated acquisition market of the “Go-Go” eighties. Rather than a period of greed and corporate excess, Wruck cites research suggesting that this was a market for corporate control – “an important component of the managerial labor market.”

As such, the opportunity to direct a corporation is viewed as a resource to be “sold” to the managerial team with greatest know-how, that was able to make the best use of this resource; the takeover market was the venue in which roving bands of managers bid for underutilized corporate resources on which they could work their magic, returning the enhanced value that would have been tragically lost.

This view steps neatly around several issues. For example, to whom does this marvelously recovered value returned? It is returned to the equity stakeholders, shareholders, and to the deal-makers.

We are told to set aside the issue of leverage as having a secondary role from the perspective of the organization and management of the resulting firms. The enormous amount of leverage is seen as a tool that allows the concentration of equity ownership that is “fundamental to the effective governance.” However, this kind of leverage typically places serious constraints on how the firm can be managed, and, coupled with the incentives, fees and so on that are incorporated into the costs of going private, demands high returns on capital. Perhaps the increased profitability is inherent in the firm, waiting to be exposed and enhanced by the new management, but rather is forced as a necessary part of the deal, and comes at a cost.

Wruck hints at this tradeoff when she mentions that this research – the research resulting in a more benign view of the private equity market – shifts the focus away from “… the unfortunate effects of some deals on employees and local communities …” Further on in the same paragraph we are told that “while questions of greed and fairness will always be with us, efficiency and value are now widely accepted as the most important social criterion in transactions involving corporate control.” So not only does this enhanced value accrue in dollar terms to those close to the deal, but it accrues generally to society in the form of “efficiency and value” – unless, of course you are one of those unfortunate employees or a stray local community or two.

To be fair, Wruck does identify a critical issue in corporate governance, a feature that allowed corporations to be the vehicle that successfully achieved the material abundance that our society enjoys, to be the victorious troops of the industrial revolution. This is the development of an organizational structure that efficiently spread risk, providing firms with the ability to access diffuse, cheap sources of equity capital.

The problem with this form of governance, in terms of building a sustainable economy based on an ecosystems of sustainable firms, is the very flaw that Wruck points out – with equity separated from managerial control, the values of the owners and the values of the managers diverge. You can think of it this way – as ownership gets diffuse, so does responsibility – and with responsibility, the ability of the owners to be held accountable for the consequences of the acts the corporation conducts.

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Patient Capital

Reflection on “A Compelling Case for Change”, found here: compellingcaseforchange

The reading does present a compelling case – it provides strong evidence that “short-termism” is both increasing, and acts against the best interests of both the business community and society as a whole. Again, we see the choice of metric – including the time scale with which the metric is measured – defining the behavior. And here the metric of short term gain causes a variety of distortions in the financial process that do indeed increase short term gain for a few, but do so with heavy costs in areas that are not measured by the metric – costs such as the depletion of long tem capital investment, economic stability, and a more equitable distribution of wealth.

In some sense this is not new news. Keynes identified this as a problem some years ago, saying

“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes the by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.”

It is interesting, and perhaps useful, to examine the dynamics that lead to this sort of thinking, but for now I am content to skim over this with the simple observation that it is a cycle that is self-reinforcing, and that the lure of money to be made is a powerful thing.

What we need to combat this trend are sources of capital that are seeking the opposite of short term returns. We need capital that it in it for the long haul – we need patient capital.

In Sweden we saw an interesting ownership model that provided just this sort of buffer against “short-termism”, indeed, seemed to be forcing movement in the other direction. Here, we had corporations formed as we do in the US. In terms of financial structure and governance, they were similar, if not identical to their counterparts in the US. However, the Swedish government owned them. In this ownership role, the Swedish Government became the provider of capital – very, very patient capital. I was astounded to hear during our visit to Vattenfall talk of a 50 year planning horizon, broken down into ten year implementation increments. In the US, a year out is considered long term in some firms, and at my firm, we are just starting to talk about a new, longer term strategic planning time frame – of three years!

The government can be a provider of patient capital for several reasons. First of all, it represents society, and as such, represents long term values. Secondly, the government is large enough that it can afford to be patient. It does not need immediate financial returns on capital in order to stay solvent.

It is important to be clear that this ownership mechanism is not Socialism, if only to avert the somewhat hysterical allergic reaction that such a term gets in this country. The state is not managing the enterprise, nor is a large government bureaucracy involved. The corporation is formed under a traditional capitalist model. The state is simply the shareholder with a controlling interest. Under this model, it as if the state simply bought all the companies stock and locked it away in a drawer somewhere. This model of ownership is not uncommon in the US.

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Slow Money Vermont

Slow Money Vermont has a different vision for how investment can be use; rather than focus on short term earnings (see “short-termism” ), they are investing for the long haul.

Here is one picture of how this type of financing could support a sustainable regional food system … link to the full document here …
slowmoneyvt_invest_thesis

[originally posted at cosmo.marlboro.edu/wrobb - an E Portfolio]